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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States leads the world in making treaties and in publicly 
holding other countries accountable when they fail to fully comply with 
treaty obligations.1  Nonetheless, the United States sometimes fails to satisfy 
its obligations under binding international agreements.  Due to the actions of 
numerous states, the United States is in violation of its treaty obligations 
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna 
Convention).2  Article 36 of the Vienna Convention governs the 
“communications and contact with nationals of the sending State” requiring 
the country who has incarcerated a non-citizen to notify the non-citizen’s 
consulate “without delay.”3  Many states in the United States fail to notify a 
non-citizen’s consulate after incarceration, and post Medellin,4 the United 
States has been unable to rectify this failure in instances where foreign 
nationals may have procedurally defaulted on their claims.  Multiple nations 
are disgusted with the manner in which the United States has handled the 
situation.  For example, Mexico has written to several U.S. representatives in 
Congress and reprimanded the United States’ behavior at international 
forums.5 
The primary concern with the United States’ failure to comply with the 
Vienna Convention is the treatment that incarcerated U.S. citizens are 
receiving abroad.  After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Medellin I, there have 
been numerous instances and high profile stories of Americans imprisoned or 
arrested in foreign nations.6  If the United States is not honoring foreign 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 2014/2015 – SUPPLEMENT, http://0-heinonl 
ine.org.gavel.law.uga.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.ustreaties/tif2015&div=2&start_page=1&c
ollection=weaties&set_as_cursor=1&men_tab=srchresults (identifying hundreds of treaties in 
force between the United States and other countries on a variety of subjects). 
 2 See generally Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2016); Ramos v. Davis, No. 08-
70044, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12091 (5th Cir. June 30, 2016) (discussing foreign detainees’ 
criminal appeals based on the alleged U.S. violation of consular notification under the Vienna 
Convention).  
 3 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261.  In this Note, the state in which a person is arrested is called the receiving state, 
since it receives a consul of another state, while the national’s home state is called the sending 
state, since it sends its consul. 
 4 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 5 See, e.g., Letter from Eduardo Medina Mora, Ambassador to Mexico, to Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman of House Judiciary Committee (July 10, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/do 
cuments/3037224-Letter-from-Ambassador-of-Mexico-to-Bob-Goodlatte.html.  
 6 See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, American Testifies in Her Murder Trial in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, 
(June 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/world/europe/13italy.html (reporting on 
the murder trial of American student Amanda Knox, who was studying abroad in Italy, and her 
testimony at the trial); Nazila Fathi & Mark Landler, In Turnabout, Iran Releases U.S. 
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visitors’ rights to contact their consulates after they have been arrested or 
detained, why should other countries offer U.S. citizens the same rights?  
The truth is that often those countries do not offer U.S. citizens such rights.7   
As U.S. citizens increase their travel abroad, providing assistance and 
protection to Americans should be a top priority for the U.S. government.8  
But nothing has yet been done to ensure every state in the United States is 
required to honor the nation’s obligations under the Vienna Convention.  It is 
the position of this Note that the only way the United States can begin to 
patch its relations with other nations and protect U.S. citizens travelling 
abroad is through sufficient legislation passed by Congress ensuring that all 
fifty states comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.  First, this 
Note will discuss the historical development of consular relations and effects 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States.  Next, 
it will address why past proposed legislation and other proposed solutions to 
fix America’s non-compliance with the Vienna Convention have failed.  
Finally, this Note will analyze the past proposed legislation and suggest 
legislation for the U.S. Congress to implement, or state legislation in the 
alternative, in order to remedy this very serious problem. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSULAR RELATIONS  
A.  Brief History and Overview of Consular Relations Law 
Consular relations have existed between sovereign states for centuries, 
even dating back to ancient Greece.9  The scope of the duties of the Greek 
counterparts to consuls were quite different, but they were nevertheless 
“responsible for representing the interests of their nationals.”10  Yet, the word 
                                                                                                                   
Journalist, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/world/middleast/1 
2iran.html (reporting on Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi’s imprisonment in Iran); see 
also, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer & Rebecca Cathcart, An Intimate Homecoming is Played out in 
Public, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/06families.html 
(reporting on the release of American journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling from North Korea). 
 7 See Louis Klarevas, Locked Up Abroad, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 4, 2011), http://foreign 
policy.com/2011/10/04/locked-up-abroad-2/ (giving multiple examples of Americans detained 
abroad and their ignored requests for consulate access). 
 8 See Nat’l Travel & Tourism Office, U.S. Citizen International Outbound Travel up Eight 
Percent in 2015 (Mar. 21, 2016), http://travel.trade.gov/tinews/archive/tinews2016/20160321. 
asp (analyzing the increasing percentage of U.S. travel overseas). 
 9 William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, 
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 259 (1998). 
 10 Yury A. Kolesnikov, Meddling with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The 
Dilemma and Proposed Statutory Solutions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 179, 184 (2009). 
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consul did not come into existence “until the time of the Romans.”11  The 
term originally signified “chief magistrates appointed in southern European 
cities,” but by the eleventh century, the definition had extended to 
magistrates sent to foreign cities as well.12  The growth of trade between 
nations promoted the development of the consular system.13  Nations began 
sending their own consulates to other nations in order “to supervise their 
commerce, protect national interests, and adjudicate disputes between 
merchants.”14  This increase in consular relations promoted trade, but when 
centralized state authority began asserting direct control over the relations, 
“confusion over the exact status” of the consulate officials ensued.15  The 
lack of clear guidance prompted many nations to create treaties on the 
matter.16  Therefore, by the middle of the twentieth century, the rules 
governing consular relations derived from bilateral treaties and the 
customary international law that developed from such agreements.17   
The United States has recognized the importance of providing protection 
to nationals abroad though consulates for the past two-hundred years.18  But 
it was not until the mid-1950s that the entire international community 
identified “the need to codify the existing rules and practices governing 
consular relations.”19  Accordingly, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (U.N.) tasked the International Law Commission with drafting a 
multilateral convention that would bring more uniformity to the laws 
governing consular relations.20  The International Law Commission 
eventually adopted the Draft Articles on Consular Relations on July 7, 
1961.21   Subsequently, the Conference on Consular Relations met in Vienna, 
Austria from March 4 until April 22, 1963 to prepare an international 
agreement on consular relations.22  There were over ninety countries and 
several international organizations in attendance, and on April 24 of 1963, 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (George W. Keeton & Georg 
Schwarzenberger eds., 1961). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 6.  The first treaty specifically referencing the functions, privileges, and immunities 
of consuls was the Franco-Spanish Convention of Pardo of March 13, 1769. 
 17 Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 185. 
 18 Cindy Galway Buys, Scott D. Pollock & Ioana Navarette Pellicer, Do Unto Others: The 
Importance of Better Compliance with Consular Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 461, 462 (2011). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Aceves, supra note 9, at 263. 
 22 Id.  
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the Conference adopted the final text of the Vienna Convention and the 
Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.23  
However, the Vienna Convention did not enter into force until March 19, 
1967.24  Currently, this multilateral treaty has over 170 parties to it25 and is 
considered by most scholars and countries to be a codification of customary 
international law, which all nations, not only the Parties to the treaty, need to 
follow.26 
B.  General Provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
As iterated above, the Vienna Convention marked the first international 
attempt to systemize existing consular practices in international law.  The 
preamble of the Vienna Convention recognizes the historical significance of 
consular practices, stating that the Parties have agreed to the treaty, while 
“[r]ecalling that consular relations have been established between peoples 
since ancient times . . . [and] [b]elieving that an international convention on 
consular relations, privileges and immunities would also contribute to the 
development of friendly relations among nations. . . .”27  The articles of the 
Vienna Convention also codify many of the consular functions nations 
historically assumed.  For instance, Article 5 describes the basic functions of 
the consulate.  Generally, consular functions encompass “protecting and 
facilitating the interests of a State and its nationals in the territory of another 
State.”28  The provisions of Article 5 were noncontroversial when adopted 
and continue to be relevant in international relations today.29 
On the other hand, the provisions of Article are at the center of 
international debate.  Titled “Communication and contact with nationals of 
the sending State,” Article 36 reads: 
1.  With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions 
relating to nationals of the sending State: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with 
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.  
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 U.N. Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, https://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280050686 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 26 Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 186. 
 27 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at Preamble. 
 28 Buys, Pollock & Pellicer, supra note 18, at 462–63. 
 29 Nicole M. Howell, A Proposal for U.S. Implementation of the Vienna Convention’s 
Consular Notification Requirement, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1324, 1335 (2013). 
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freedom with respect to communication with and access 
to consular officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the 
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular 
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a 
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or 
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other 
manner.  Any communication addressed to the consular 
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or 
detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities 
without delay.  The said authorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this 
sub-paragraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national 
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or 
detention, to converse and correspond with him and to 
arrange for his legal representation.  They shall also have 
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is 
in prison, custody or detention in their district in 
pursuance of a judgment.  Nevertheless, consular officers 
shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national 
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly 
opposes such action. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be 
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said 
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the 
purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are 
intended.30 
On first impression, the notification and access requirements of Article 36 
seem to be fairly simple.  Under Article 36(1)(a), consulate officials have the 
right to speak freely with foreign nationals, and foreign nationals have the 
right to speak freely with their consulate, despite any detention or 
incarceration.  Article 36(1)(b) requires the receiving State to notify the 
consulate of the sending State without delay if a national of that State has 
been arrested.  Article 36(1)(c) requires the receiving State to allow consular 
contact with the foreign national.  Lastly, Article 36(2) asserts that the rights 
provided for in the article must be exercised in conformity with the laws of 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3. 
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the receiving State, but the laws and regulations cannot nullify the rights in 
question. 
C.  The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice 
Under the United Nations Charter, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
is the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”31  Nonetheless, like 
most international courts, the ICJ only has jurisdiction over cases where all 
parties have consented to the court’s jurisdiction to resolve a particular 
dispute.32  Nations may provide consent to ICJ jurisdiction in three different 
ways: “ante hoc (in advance of a dispute), ad hoc (once a dispute has arisen), 
or post hoc (expressed after the case has been brought before the Court by 
the other party).”33  Separate treaties are one way to consent ante hoc, and 
the Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
(Optional Protocol) is one example of such a treaty.  The Optional Protocol 
is a voluntary agreement incorporated into the Vienna Convention, which 
requires the parties to the agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
for disputes arising from the Vienna Convention.34   
Once the ICJ has jurisdiction over the case, its final decisions are binding 
on the nations that are parties to the dispute.35  Under the U.N. Charter, “each 
Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”36  
Considering the strong language of the provision, the U.N. Charter presumes 
that all parties have an international obligation to comply with the rulings of 
the ICJ.  The United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945, but the United 
States Senate did not expressly allocate the “domestic responsibility for 
implementing ICJ decisions.”37  Congress did delegate some power to the 
President, including the power to send congressionally approved officers to 
represent the United States before the ICJ and the power to appoint 
representatives to the U.N.’s principal organs.38  Nonetheless, Congress’s 
failure to assign responsibility to implement ICJ decisions has created 
uncertainty about how to comply with the U.N. Charter domestically. 
                                                                                                                   
 31 U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 32 Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 187. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Joshua J. Newcomer, Messing with Texas? Why President Bush’s Memorandum Order 
Trumps State Criminal Procedure, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (2006). 
 35 Id. at 1033. 
 36 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.  
 37 Newcomer, supra note 34, at 1033. 
 38 Id. at 1033–34. 
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III.  HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  United States’ Ratification of the Vienna Convention 
In 1963, at the time of the United Nations Conference on Consular 
Relations, the United States had enacted bilateral treaties with twenty-eight 
different countries regarding consular notification and access upon arrest of a 
foreign citizen.39  Nonetheless, these treaties did not always have the 
mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance.40  The United States had to 
seek an alternative weapon against such ineffective bilateral treaties in order 
to protect American nationals.  Consequently, the United States signed the 
Vienna Convention on April 24, 1963 along with the Optional Protocol.41  
However, the Vienna Convention was not immediately approved by the 
Senate.  President Nixon wrote on May 5, 1969 urging the Senate to “give 
early and favorable consideration” to the Vienna Convention.42  
Subsequently, the Senate approved the Vienna Convention on October 22, 
1969, and President Nixon ratified it on November 12, 1969.43  The 
Convention officially entered into force for the United States on December 
24, 1969.44 
Despite the fact that the Convention is a binding international agreement 
that was duly ratified by the United States, the United States has failed to 
fully comply with its obligations.  Within the last decade, the prominence of 
the United States’ failure has been recognized by the international 
community.  The issue has stemmed from the way treaties become law in the 
United States.  First, for a treaty to be deemed binding upon each state in the 
United States under U.S. law, the treaty provision must be self-executing or 
implemented by Congress in federal legislation.45  If a treaty provision is 
self-executing, it has the same authority on all states as a law implemented 
by Congress.  If a treaty provision is non-self-executing, the treaty provision 
merely creates a U.S. obligation and is not directly enforceable on the 
individual states.  But, a non-self-executing treaty provision can become 
domestic law through enactment of federal legislation codifying the treaty.46   
                                                                                                                   
 39 Howell, supra note 29, at 1332. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Aceves, supra note 9, at 267. 
 42 Letter from President Richard Nixon to U.S. Senate (May 5, 1969), http://www.presiden 
cy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2036. 
 43 Aceves, supra note 9, at 268. 
 44 Id. at 269. 
 45 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008). 
 46 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §7. 
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For decades, the Vienna Convention had been understood as self-
executing in the United States.47  However, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided 
the question about the self-execution of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.  
Instead, the Supreme Court held in Medellin I and Medellin II that the ICJ’s 
Avena judgment (which implemented Article 36) created an international 
obligation on part of the United States, but none of the relevant treaty 
sources (Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute) “creates 
binding federal law in the absence of [Congress] implementing legislation.”48  
In 1967, the United States did promulgate regulations in order “to establish a 
uniform procedure for consular notification when nationals of foreign 
countries are arrested by officers of the Department of Justice” in 28 C.F.R. 
Section 50.5.49  However, these regulations only guarantee compliance by 
federal officers within the Department of Justice.  As it stands, the Vienna 
Convention is still not enforceable at the state level. 
B.  The Application of the Vienna Convention in the United States 
Since the United States failed to comply with its obligations under Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention, three different cases have been filed against 
the United States in the ICJ.50  Because the United States was a party to the 
Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention, the United States had no choice 
but to consent to the jurisdiction of the court.  The ICJ found in all three 
cases that the United States had failed to fulfill its obligations under the 
Vienna Convention with respect to the consular notification and access 
requirements of Article 36.51  Since the United States consistently failed to 
follow the ICJ’s ruling, the ICJ took increased measures towards the United 
States with each case brought before them.  The ICJ first issued provisional 
measures to the United States, but then it issued final, severe judgments.52 
In its 2004 Avena decision, the ICJ discussed the United States’ violations 
of the Vienna Convention on a larger scale than ever before.  Each of the 
previous cases that came before the ICJ, concerning the United States and the 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Howell, supra note 29, at 1354. 
 48 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 506; Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008). 
 49 Aceves, supra note 9, at 273. 
 50 See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9). 
 51 Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 71; Ger. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 515; Para. v. U.S., 1998 I.C.J 
at 249. 
 52 See Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 71–72 (holding the United States had breached Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention and the Judgment should be applied to other foreign nationals 
similarly situated in the United States, not only the fifty-one Mexican nationals in the case). 
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Vienna Convention, concerned the denied right of consular access to one 
individual.  But, within Avena, the ICJ was asked to rule on whether the 
rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals were violated by the United States’ 
failure to inform the detainees of their right to consular notification and 
access.53  In its decision, the ICJ held Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 
confers individual rights; the United States violated those rights with respect 
to the fifty‐one Mexican nationals; and as a remedy for these violations, the 
United States was required to provide the Mexican nationals with review and 
reconsideration of their convictions.54  Additionally, the ICJ found the United 
States had violated Article 36 by not informing the Mexican consulate about 
its detained nationals, which prevented the consulate from providing legal 
assistance.55   
Since the ICJ was tired of hearing disputes brought against the United 
States under the Vienna Convention, the Court in Avena decided to elaborate 
on its expectations for the United States in their Judgment.  For instance, the 
ICJ clarified the actual meaning of “review and reconsideration,” which it 
had first discussed in LaGrand.  The ICJ stated that “review and 
consideration” should consider the violation of the rights set forth in Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention, should be of both convictions and sentences, 
and should happen within the overall judicial proceedings of each specific 
defendant.56  The ICJ likewise concluded that the United States’ procedural 
default rule57 could not be applied in a way to prohibit the full effect of the 
purpose of Article 36 and could not interfere with proper “review and 
reconsideration.”58  Generally, ICJ judgments are only binding with regard to 
the particular case, but the ICJ expected its Avena ruling to “apply to other 
foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United 
States” and not only to the fifty-one Mexican nationals whose rights were at 
issue.59 
After the Avena decision, it appeared that the U.S. federal government, at 
least the Executive Branch, seemed ready to comply with the ICJ’s ruling.  
President Bush’s actions following the Avena decision illustrated not only his 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 23. 
 54 Id. at 65–66. 
 55 Id. at 71–72. 
 56 Id. at 65–66. 
 57 Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 
1143, 1166 (2005) (noting “[t]he procedural default doctrine holds that a habeas petitioner 
must first present his federal law argument to the state courts in compliance with state 
procedural rules. . . . [and] [f]ailure to do so will bar any attempt to present that argument to 
the federal courts on collateral review.”). 
 58 Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 57. 
 59 Id. at 70. 
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frustration with the country’s failure to honor its obligations under Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention but also his recognition of the importance of 
complying with the consular notification and access requirements of Article 
36.  On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum 
demanding that all fifty states give effect to the ICJ’s decision in Avena: 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as 
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States 
of America, that the United States will discharge its inter-
national obligations under the decision of the International 
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 
(Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give 
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of 
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in 
that decision.60 
The President clearly made an effort to comply with the ICJ’s order, even 
though he had no power to make the order enforceable.61  President Bush 
believed that he had the independent authority to implement Avena and 
overrule any state-level procedural rules that might prevent “review and 
reconsideration” of the fifty-one individuals named in the decision.62  
Arguably, since the Avena decision stated that its ruling should “apply to 
other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United 
States,”63  the United States would have to comply with the “review and 
reconsideration” order with more prisoners than the fifty-one Mexican 
nationals.  Still, it is clear that the courts of the United States could not 
possibly comply with the order for every similarly situated foreign 
prisoner.64  Both federal and state courts can barely handle the cases placed 
on their dockets now. 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10_Avena_compliance.pdf. 
 61 Nancy Alexander, Comment, Saved by the States? The Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, Federal Government Shortcomings, and Oregon’s Rescue, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 819, 833–834 (2011).  See also Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 525–26. 
 62 Newcomer, supra note 34, at 1038. 
 63 Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 70. 
 64 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: 
INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS (2011) (finding there were over 
55,000 criminal aliens in the U.S. federal prison system alone in 2010 and over 296,000 in 
state prison systems and local jails in 2009). 
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President Bush was not alone in his efforts to get the states to comply 
with the Avena ruling.  The Attorney General and the Secretary of State sent 
letters to the state courts, including multiple letters to the State of Texas, 
urging the courts to comply and provide “review and reconsideration.”65  The 
U.S. government also filed amicus briefs and orchestrated “high level 
diplomatic discussions to find alternative approaches for ‘review and 
reconsideration’ ” in the alternative.66  As noted by several scholars, “these 
actions show that the United States recognized the importance of compliance 
with the judgment to ‘smooth out U.S. relations with Mexico,’ help repair 
U.S. international integrity with respect to Article 36, and to encourage 
compliance with respect to U.S. citizens abroad.”67  
Despite these measures to support the Avena decision, on March 7, 2005, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a letter to the U.N. to inform it that 
the United States had formally withdrawn from the Optional Protocol.68  “As 
a consequence of this withdrawal,” Secretary Rice wrote, “the United States 
will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
reflected in that Protocol.”69  The international community interpreted the 
letter as an immediate withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, which brought 
forth concerns about the United States’ commitment to its reciprocal, 
international obligations that the Protocol embodied.70  The State Department 
elaborated that “the administration was troubled by foreign interference in 
the domestic capital system but intended to fulfill its obligations under 
international law.”71  This statement did not curtail the international criticism 
that followed.   
C.  The Supreme Court and the Vienna Convention 
Meanwhile, a case concerning Jose Ernesto Medellin, one of the Mexican 
nationals from the Avena decision, was making its way to the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Scott W. Lyons, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law after Medellín v. Texas: 
Breach Without Remedy in the International Forum and the Need for Self-help: The 
Conundrum Resulting from the Medellín Case, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 73, 83 (2009). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Alexander, supra note 61, at 833.  See also Lyons, supra note 65, at 83 (noting multiple 
U.S. actions that reflected a determination to remedy the U.S.’s breach of the VCCR). 
 68 Howell, supra note 29, at 1352. 
 69 Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Sec’y-Gen. of the 
U.N. (Mar. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf.  
 70 See generally Charles Lane, Editorial, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01; Howell, supra note 29, at 1353–54. 
 71 Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/us-says-it-has-withdrawn-from-world 
-judicial-body.html. 
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Court.  But before Medellin’s case, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, “issued 
after Avena but involving individuals who were not named in the Avena 
judgment,” the Supreme Court held “that, contrary to the ICJ’s 
determination, the Vienna Convention did not preclude the application of 
state default rules.”72  Therefore, the entire international community was on 
edge, questioning whether the U.S. Supreme Court would make an exception 
to its previous ruling for the fifty-one nationals involved in the Avena 
decision.  The Medellin case helped to answer this question.  
Jose Ernesto Medellin was convicted for capital murder and sentenced to 
death by a Texas state court for the gang rape and massacre of two teenagers.  
After his sentence, in his first application for state post-conviction relief, 
Medellin raised a claim based on the violation of his rights under the Vienna 
Convention.  The state court rejected the claim on two bases: the claim was 
procedurally defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it earlier and the 
claim failed to show any prejudice arising from the violation.73  Medellin’s 
habeas corpus petition in the federal district court was denied on the same 
grounds.  The Fifth Circuit also denied a certificate of appealability.74  The 
Fifth Circuit concluded that there are no individually enforceable rights 
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.75  Even though the ICJ ruled in 
LaGrand, and reiterated in Avena, that procedural default rules could not bar 
a petitioner’s claim, the Fifth Circuit held that it could “not disregard the 
Supreme Court’s clear holding that ordinary procedural default rules can bar 
Vienna Convention claims.”76 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.77  Before oral 
argument could occur, the President issued his memorandum, discussed 
above, so Medellin filed another application for relief in Texas state court.78  
Since the Supreme Court believed that Medellin may be provided with the 
review and reconsideration he requested within the state court system, and 
because his federal relief claim may have otherwise been barred, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari.79  The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals subsequently dismissed Medellin’s second application for 
relief.80  The Texas court held that neither the Avena decision nor the 
President’s memorandum constituted binding federal law that could serve as 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008). 
 73 Id. at 502–03. 
 74 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 75 Id. at 280. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005). 
 78 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 503. 
 79 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 664. 
 80 Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
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a legal basis for Medellin’s second writ.81  As a result, the Supreme Court 
again granted certiorari.82 
Ultimately, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court had two fundamental 
questions to answer.  First, the Supreme Court needed to decide whether the 
“ICJ’s judgment in Avena [is] directly enforceable as domestic law in a state 
court in the United States.”83  Second, the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether the “President’s Memorandum independently require[s] the States to 
provide review and reconsideration of the claims of the fifty-one Mexican 
nationals named in Avena without regard to state procedural default rules.”84  
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the Court. 
The Supreme Court first analyzed Medellin’s argument that the Optional 
Protocol, U.N. Charter, and ICJ Statute together constituted relevant 
authority to give the Avena judgment binding effect on all domestic courts in 
the United States.85  The Optional Protocol, as previously noted, is merely a 
bare grant of jurisdiction to the ICJ, and the treaty is silent about the effect of 
an ICJ decision.86  Instead, the U.N. Charter provides the mechanism for 
compliance with ICJ decisions in Article 94.87  As a result, the Supreme 
Court found that the U.N. Charter did not “contemplate the automatic 
enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts.”88  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court noted that the ICJ Statute itself provided further confirmation 
for its finding.89  Ultimately, the Avena decision creates an international 
obligation on the part of the United States, but it does not of its own force 
constitute binding federal law. 
The Supreme Court then analyzed whether the ICJ’s judgment in Avena is 
binding on state courts by virtue of President Bush’s February 28, 2005 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Id. 
 82 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 504. 
 83 Id. at 498. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 506–14. 
 86 Id. at 507–08.  Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that “[e]ach Member of the 
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a 
party.” (emphasis added). U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1. 
 87 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 508.  Article 94(2) provides,  
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under 
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the 
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations 
or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 
U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 2. 
 88 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 509. 
 89 Id. at 511.  Article 59 of the statute states that “[t]he decision of the [ICJ] has no binding 
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” (emphasis added).  
Medellin cannot be considered a party to the Avena decision since the ICJ decides disputes 
between nations only. 
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Memorandum.  Arguably, since the President acted pursuant to his powers 
authorized by the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter acquiesced by 
Congress, the President had the authority to implement the Avena 
judgment.90  The Court disagreed, relying on the text of the U.S. Constitution 
which gives Congress the power to make laws and not the President.91  
Further, since the treaties were ratified as non-self-executing, the President 
could not unilaterally make them self-executing.92  The Court also found that 
the Executive’s power to settle international disputes does not extend as far 
as the unprecedented directive in President Bush’s Memorandum, which 
affected state’s police powers.93  And the President could not rely on his 
Take Care power in the Constitution since the Avena decision is not domestic 
law.94  In sum, the Supreme Court concluded 6–3 that neither Avena nor the 
President’s Memorandum constituted directly enforceable federal law that 
would pre-empt state limitations on filing of successive habeas petitions.95 
Justice Breyer wrote the sole dissenting opinion of Medellin I, joined by 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, in which he used a seven-step test to show 
why “the United States’ treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ judgment in 
Avena is enforceable in [domestic] court[s].”96  First, Justice Breyer attacked 
the majority’s emphasis on the phrase “undertakes to comply” as proof that 
ICJ decisions are not self-executing.97  The majority looked at precedent 
where the Court previously found treaty provisions self-executing, but they 
could not find any clear language.98  Justice Breyer argued that the majority 
did not find such plain language because many of the treaties ratified by the 
United States must allow different nations to implement the treaties by their 
own practice.99  Not all countries have the convenience the Supremacy 
Clause provides to the United States.100   
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. at 525. 
 91 Id. at 526.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 92 Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 527.  By definition, non-self-executing treaties do not have 
domestic effect of their own force. 
 93 Id. at 532. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 498–99. 
 96 Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. at 551. 
 98 Id. at 547–48. 
 99 Id. at 548. 
 100 Id.  For example, Britain takes “the view that the British Crown makes treaties but 
Parliament makes domestic law, [which] virtually always requires parliamentary legislation.”  
By contrast, the Netherlands, like the United States, “directly incorporates many treaties 
concluded by the executive into its domestic law even without explicit parliamentary approval 
of the treaty.” 
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Thus, in Justice Breyer’s opinion, the relevant treaties (i.e., U.N. Charter, 
Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute) suggest that the drafters intended for ICJ 
decisions to be automatically enforceable in domestic courts.101  The 
Optional Protocol gives compulsory jurisdiction over Vienna Convention 
disputes to the ICJ, whose proceedings are binding.102  The United States has 
ratified seventy treaties with similar ICJ dispute resolution provisions and 
has interpreted those treaties as self-executing.103  There is no reason to treat 
the Optional Protocol provisions differently.104  Further, Justice Breyer 
argues that enforcement of the Avena decision is best suited for courts 
experienced in criminal law and procedures rather than by legislative 
enactment.105  Finally, President Bush favored direct judicial enforcement, 
and Congress had expressed no reservation to it.106  Therefore, since the 
treaty is self-executing, the Avena ruling should be enforceable in domestic 
courts without congressional action per the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution. 
Unfortunately for Medellin, Justice Breyer was on the losing side of this 
decision, but Medellin was not going to give up easily.  On his scheduled 
execution day, Medellin again brought his case before the U.S. Supreme 
Court to ask for a stay of execution.  He based his case on the theory that 
either Congress or the Texas state legislature might implement the ICJ’s 
decision that violations of the Vienna Convention are grounds for 
reconsideration and review.107  Neither the President nor the Texas governor 
had represented to the Supreme Court that legislative action was likely.  
Congress had not progressed past the introduction of a bill in the four years 
since the Avena decision and four months since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Medellin I.108  Thus, the Supreme Court determined that the 
possibilities Medellin relied on were “too remote to justify an order” to stay 
“the sentence imposed by the Texas courts.”109  Additionally, Medellin did 
not have the necessary ground to ask for a stay of execution because he 
failed to prove that his conviction was obtained unlawfully.110  Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Id. at 551. 
 102 Id. at 539. 
 103 Id. at 541. 
 104 Id. at 541–42. 
 105 Id. at 563. 
 106 Id. at 538–39. 
 107 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II) 554 U.S. 759, 759 (2008). 
 108 Id. at 759–60. 
 109 Id. at 759. 
 110 Id. at 760. 
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the state of Texas proceeded with the execution, and Medellin was 
pronounced dead by lethal injection at 9:57 p.m. on August 5, 2008.111 
More recently in Garcia v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court case ruled on 
U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention.112  Humberto Leal Garcia, another 
Mexican national named in the Avena decision, was convicted and sentenced 
to death by a Texas court.113  After multiple failed petitions and requests for 
relief in both state and federal courts, Garcia sought a stay of execution from 
the Supreme Court in order to allow Congress time to enact legislation 
implementing the Avena decision.114  However, “the Supreme Court justices 
split 5–4 along conservative-liberal lines in denying a stay of execution.”115 
In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court first disposed of Garcia’s 
due process claim that Texas could not execute him while proposed 
legislation was under consideration.116  Next, the Court rejected the 
government’s argument that Garcia’s stay of execution should be granted in 
support of future jurisdiction which would arise once the impending 
legislation was enacted.117  The Court highlighted, “[o]ur task is to rule on 
what the law is, not what it might eventually be.”118  But, even if the Court 
could issue a stay on the basis of unenacted legislation, Garcia’s case would 
not be the appropriate vehicle.119  The Court, alluding to its statement in 
Medellin II, noted that Congress obviously did not view legislation 
implementing the Vienna Convention as a priority.120  Additionally, the 
government refused to concede that Garcia had been prejudiced from his lack 
of consular access, which, as noted, is a prerequisite for any stay of 
execution.121  Accordingly, Garcia was executed and pronounced dead at 
7:21 p.m. on July 7, 2011.122 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston Teens, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Medellin 
-executed-for-rape-murder-of-Houston-1770696.php.  
 112 Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. 940 (2011). 
 113 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 25 
(Mar. 31). 
 114 Garcia, 564 U.S. at 940–41. 
 115 Bill Mears, Mexican National Executed in Texas, CNN (July 7, 2011), http://www.cnn. 
com/2011/CRIME/07/07/texas.mexican.execution/.  
 116 Garcia, 564 U.S. at 942. 
 117 Id. at 941. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 942. 
 120 Id.  At the time of this opinion, it had been seven years since Avena’s decision and three 
years since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Medellin I. 
 121 Id. at 942–43. 
 122 Mears, supra note 115. 
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Again, Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, which adopted the government’s position 
that permitting Texas to execute Garcia amounted to a breach of the United 
States’ international obligations.123  Like the previous administration, 
President Obama failed to urge the Court to delay Garcia’s execution.124  
After the decision, Sandra Babcock, the lead appellate attorney expressed her 
concern with the United States’ inaction.125  She emphasized, “[t]he 
execution of Mr. Leal [Garcia] violates the United States’ treaty 
commitments, threatens the nation's foreign policy interests, and undermines 
the safety of all Americans abroad.”126  Today, her words still ring truthfully 
for the United States’ predicament. 
IV.  PAST PROPOSALS  
A.  Failed Attempts at Legislative Reform 
Even though the Supreme Court ruled that the Avena decision and the 
President’s Memorandum did not constitute enforceable law on the states, it 
noted that “Congress could elect to give [the Vienna Convention] wholesale 
effect . . . through implementing legislation, as it regularly has” with other 
non-self-executing treaties.127  As a result, three different bills have been 
proposed in order to bring the United States into compliance with its 
obligations under the Vienna Convention.  Alas, none of the bills have 
managed to pass congressional approval. 
First, the Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008 (Avena Act) was 
introduced on July 14, 2008 by Howard Berman (D-CA) and Zoe Lofgren 
(D-CA).128  The Avena Act was in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Medellin I.  The Avena Act sought “[t]o create a civil action to provide 
judicial remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the United States” 
under the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol.129  It provided that 
“any person whose rights are infringed by a violation by any nonforeign 
governmental authority of [A]rticle 36 of the Vienna Convention” may 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. 940, 943–44 (2011). 
 124 Mears, supra note 115.  
 125 Id. Sandra said, “The need for congressional action to restore our reputation and protect 
our citizens is more urgent than ever.” 
 126 Id.  
 127 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 520 (2008). 
 128 Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008), https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/6481/text.   
 129 Id. 
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obtain relief by civil action.130  In section 2(b), the Avena Act further defined 
appropriate relief as: 
any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to secure the 
rights; and . . . in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a 
criminal offense where the violation occurs during and in 
relation to the investigation or prosecution of that offense, any 
relief required to remedy the harm done by the violation, 
including the vitiation of the conviction or sentence where 
appropriate.131   
The Avena Act would have applied to past violations.132  However, it never 
made it out of the House Committee of the Judiciary. 
On June 14, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) renewed the effort to 
bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna Convention by 
introducing the Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011 (CNCA).133  
The CNCA was considerably more detailed than the failed Avena Act.134  
After its introduction, Senator Leahy received such favorable support that he 
announced on June 29, 2011 that he planned to hold a hearing on the bill in 
July.135  The CNCA’s stated purpose was “[t]o facilitate compliance with 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna 
April 24, 1963, and for other purposes.”136  Essentially, the CNCA directly 
incorporated the language of Article 36 into legislation by reaffirming that 
the obligations under the Vienna Convention are federal law and apply to all 
foreign nationals arrested or detained in the United States.137  Further, the 
                                                                                                                   
 130 Id. § 2(a). 
 131 Id. § 2(b). 
 132 Id. § 2(c). 
 133 157 CONG. REC. S3779 (daily ed. June 14, 2011) (introducing the CNCA legislation and 
letters of support); see also Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate, Leahy Renews Effort 
To Bring U.S. Into Compliance With International Consular Notification Treaty (June 14, 
2011), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-renews-effort-to-bring-us-into-compliance-w 
ith-international-consular-notification-treaty [hereinafter Leahy CNCA Press Release]. 
 134 Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/1194?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.+119 
4%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=3.  
 135 157 CONG. REC. S4215 (daily ed. June 29, 2011) (noting “favorable commentary the bill 
has generated, including multiple editorials in major newspapers and numerous letters of 
support from across the political spectrum”). 
 136 S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011). 
 137 See id. § 3(a).  Section 3(a) provides,  
[I]f an individual who is not a national of the United States is detained or 
arrested by an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or 
local government, the arresting or detaining officer or employee, or other 
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CNCA provided limited post-conviction relief by giving federal courts the 
jurisdiction “to review cases of foreign nationals currently on death row in 
the United States, who did not receive consular access.”138  But, in order for 
those foreign nationals to obtain relief, they would have to establish not only 
a violation of their consular notification rights but also that the violation 
resulted in “actual prejudice.”139  Senator Leahy adequately summarized the 
bill’s three main purposes as protecting American citizens abroad, fulfilling 
the United States’ legal obligations, and removing an impediment to 
cooperation with international allies.140  The CNCA was not a perfect 
solution for bringing the United States into complete compliance with the 
Vienna Convention, but it was a step in the right direction. 
Without a doubt, the CNCA had numerous supporters and was given 
much more consideration than the Avena Act.141  The CNCA is the only 
proposed legislation concerning the Vienna Convention that had a hearing on 
its contents, which occurred on July 27, 2011.  Senator Leahy had multiple, 
qualified witnesses testify on behalf of the CNCA at the hearing before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.142  The witnesses stressed how continued 
failure to give effect to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in the United 
States would invite foreign nations to reciprocate by disregarding the rights 
of U.S. citizens arrested or detained in their countries. 
One witness, however, spoke in opposition to the legislation at the 
hearing.  The witness argued that the CNCA raised constitutional issues 
which weighed against its enactment.143  In his view, enactment of the 
CNCA would not be within Congress’ power under the Constitution.  The 
federal government has certain enumerated powers and the rest are left to the 
states.  The witness argued that the CNCA encroached on the states’ police 
powers by commandeering state officials to carry out federal obligations.144  
The witness did not disagree that the policies the bill promoted were 
                                                                                                                   
appropriate officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or local 
government, shall notify that individual without delay that the individual may 
request that the consulate of the foreign state of which the individual is a 
national be notified of the detention or arrest. 
 138 Leahy CNCA Press Release, supra note 133; see S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2011). 
 139 S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2011). 
 140 157 CONG. REC. S4216 (daily ed. June 29, 2011). 
 141 See generally Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: 
Hearing on S. 1194 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter 
Hearings]. 
 142 Id. at 5–31.  The witnesses included two esteemed lawyers, a freelance journalist, the 
Under Secretary for Management, and the Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 
 143 Id. at 24. 
 144 Id. at 25 (noting “[t]hese limitations are plain and well described in Supreme Court case 
law, including such seminal cases as New York v. United States and Printz v. United States”). 
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worthwhile; he merely felt that its constitutional concerns took precedent 
over its passing. 
Nonetheless, the CNCA had widespread support.  The Obama 
Administration supported the legislation, along with the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the Department of State.145  Multiple letters, articles, and statements 
from different entities were attached to the end of the hearing record in order 
to convey further support for the proposed legislation.  Despite the 
overwhelming amount of support, the CNCA never reported out into the 
Senate for a vote. 
On May 24, 2012, Senator Leahy attempted a different approach to bring 
the United States into compliance with the Vienna Convention.  He placed 
the relevant provision into the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2013 (S. 3241).146  As 
usual, the media had moved on to the next topic, but Senator Leahy had not 
yet given up on bringing the United States into compliance with the Vienna 
Convention.  Section 7090 of S. 3241 was very similar to the CNCA, but it 
was not identical.  The Senate Appropriations Committee’s Report on the bill 
noted the key differences from the CNCA.  For example, Section 7090 
omitted Section 3 of the CNCA, “which set forth practical guidance for 
compliance with U.S. consular notification and access obligations.”147  The 
Committee felt the section was unnecessary since the Vienna Convention is 
self-executing, and it wanted to encourage the work already being done by 
the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and 
the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).148  The Committee also added several 
provisions which were absent from the CNCA.  Section 7090 described the 
effect of prior adjudication149 and gave the federal courts a timeline to render 
                                                                                                                   
 145 Leahy CNCA Press Release, supra note 133. 
 146 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090 (2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-
congress/senate-bill/3241/text. 
 147 S. REP. NO. 112-72, at 68–69 (2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt172/ 
pdf/CRPT-112srpt172.pdf. 
 148 Id. at 69.  The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was 
working on updating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to facilitate compliance with 
consular notification and access requirements.  The ULC promotes uniformity of law among 
the several states in the U.S. on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.  
Thus, the ULC was trying to create model legislation implementing the consular notification 
requirements as well. 
 149 Id.; see also S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090(a)(3)(B) (2012) (noting “[a] petition for review 
under this subsection shall not be granted if the claimed violation . . . has previously been 
adjudicated . . . unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination”). 
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a judgment.150  It also clarified that a federal court could refer a petition for 
review to a federal magistrate.151 
The key difference between the CNCA and Section 7090 of S. 3241 was 
the manner in which a foreign defendant could request review of his or her 
conviction.  As noted by Senator Leahy, the CNCA would permit “foreign 
nationals who have been convicted and sentenced to death to ask a court to 
review their cases and determine if the failure to provide consular 
notification led to an unfair conviction or sentence.”152  On the other hand, 
Section 7090 of S. 3241 required a petition to make an initial showing before 
the case could even qualify for review.153  Both bills still required the foreign 
defendant to make a showing of “actual prejudice” in order to obtain relief.154  
Like other efforts to bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna 
Convention, Section 7090 of S. 3241 did not receive congressional approval. 
In 2013, Congress continued to consider legislation that would facilitate 
compliance with the Avena ruling.  The previous failed legislation, S. 3241 
Section 7090, was placed into a Senate Appropriations Act.155  The House 
rejected the Senate provision, and a related House bill became public law 
instead on January 17, 2014, without any provisions concerning the Vienna 
Convention.156  
Senator Leahy’s most recent attempt to bring the United States into 
compliance with the Vienna Convention was a bill he introduced on June 19, 
2014.157  With this attempt, Senator Leahy tried a third time to place the 
relevant provision into an appropriations act.158  Nevertheless, the relevant 
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section did not become law.159  The House rejected the Senate provision, and 
a related House bill was enacted instead on December 16, 2014, without any 
provisions concerning the Vienna Convention.160  Progress, however, was 
made towards bringing the United States into compliance with its consular 
notification and access obligations this legislative session through an update 
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.161  The new Rules took effect on 
December 1, 2014, and require a federal magistrate judge to inform a foreign 
defendant charged with a federal crime at his or her initial appearance that he 
or she “may request that an attorney for the government or a federal law 
enforcement official notify a consular officer from the defendant’s country of 
nationality that the defendant has been arrested. . . .”162  The advisory 
committee on this amendment noted that the arresting officers still have the 
primary responsibility to notify a defendant’s consulate upon notice from the 
defendant, but this addition was to serve as “additional assurance that U.S. 
treaty obligations are fulfilled, and to create a judicial record of that 
action.”163  Although a step in the right direction, the amendment does not 
reduce the need for legislation which would bring the nation into full 
compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.  And, regrettably, the 
United States currently has no passed (or pending) legislation towards that 
goal. 
Why has every attempt at implementing the Vienna Convention failed at 
the federal level?  None of the proposed legislation since the first attempt to 
place a Vienna Convention provision in an appropriations bill has had any 
documented discussion.  It can be inferred from the lack of debate that such 
efforts have failed for a variety of reasons.  One possibility is the lack of 
media attention towards the topic since Medellin I.  Despite the production of 
shows like “Locked Up Abroad,” the American public has viewed the issue 
with apathy.  Another possibility could be the jarring nature of politics.  The 
United States’ non-compliance with the Vienna Convention was brought to 
light by cases involving the death penalty, a topic which has a clear, divisive 
line between liberals and conservatives.  Both sides seem to view 
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implementation of the Vienna Convention as an affirmative step towards 
dismantling the death penalty.  Even though it is not necessarily the truth, the 
concern definitely hovers over Vienna Convention legislation.  This 
combination of little media attention and discord among political parties 
makes passing legislation extremely difficult. 
B.  Various Proposals for Compliance 
Considering the United States has been in violation of Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention for at least twelve years, scholars have developed an 
array of approaches to improve America’s compliance with consular 
notification and access, but none have been adopted.  Before Avena and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin I, William Aceves recognized the 
consequences if the United States failed to improve its compliance under the 
Vienna Convention.  As a result, he made several recommendations.164  
Aceves suggested the United States increase its monitoring with federal 
agencies through the State Department, cooperate with foreign governments 
to develop procedures to improve compliance, and induce law enforcement 
agencies to identify foreign nationals shortly after detention.165  He also 
suggested Congress enact legislation to allow foreign governments to sue in 
federal courts for treaty violations, or in the alternative, the U.S. federal 
government should sue on behalf of foreign governments to challenge treaty 
violations.166   
Aveces’ recommendations were based on a sense of reciprocity, but these 
suggestions do not create mandatory regulations for state or federal agencies.  
For example, the U.S. State Department has prepared and circulated training 
materials throughout the nation to inform local law enforcement agencies 
about the Vienna Convention.  U.S. State Department experts even travel 
around the country to provide in-person training on consular notification and 
access.  Recently, in August 2016, the State Department released its fourth 
edition of Consular Notification and Access.167 In 2009, the U.S. State 
Department sent 200,000 consular notification and training materials to law 
enforcement agencies across the United States.168  But since the State 
Department cannot ensure the training is undertaken or followed, violations 
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continue to occur.  Alternatively, it would be very difficult for Congress to 
allow foreign governments access to U.S. courts through legislation since the 
Supreme Court has continually reiterated that U.S. states are immune from 
suit under the Eleventh Amendment.169  It would be impractical for the U.S. 
government to sue on behalf of other nations for all state and local violations 
of the Vienna Convention; the U.S. has enough cases to handle own its own. 
After the Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008 failed, Edward Duffy 
argued that the “federal government could use the Spending Power to fashion 
conditional grants to the states, contingent on their satisfaction of Vienna 
Convention obligations.”170  He viewed this option as the most viable 
considering the constraints placed on the federal government through both 
the Constitution and political processes.171  Nevertheless, Duffy’s solution is 
not the most ideal.  It would require an incentive for Congressional officials 
to encourage states to comply.  As of now, it does not appear that such an 
incentive actually exists.172  The United States has been criticized by the ICJ 
for its Vienna Convention violations, and since its withdrawal from the 
Optional Protocol, the United States has consistently received criticism from 
the international community for its ongoing failure to comply with its legal 
obligations.  This failure places U.S. citizens at risk when traveling abroad, 
because other nations are less likely to honor their obligations under the 
Vienna Convention when the United States fails to provide consular 
notification and access to foreign nationals.  Despite this risk, the majority of 
states have not complied on their own accord.  There is no stronger incentive 
that could arise than protecting the lives’ of U.S. citizens. 
In 2013, Nicole Howell proposed the “United States seek bilateral 
modification of the Vienna Convention to limit its application to noncitizen 
capital offenses and exclude the minor offenses that make U.S. compliance 
with Article 36 unrealistic.”173  Bilateral modification of an international 
treaty can occur when two or more countries agree to modify the terms of the 
treaty as between themselves alone.  Modification of the Vienna Convention 
is allowed and governed by Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which describes how Parties to a multilateral treaty may modify 
the treaty’s terms.174  Howell stresses that the United States could prioritize 
the modification with those countries whose citizens are incarcerated most 
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often in the United States like Mexico and China.175  Her solution would 
place a considerably lighter burden on U.S. law enforcement officials, 
especially since she proposes that a second responsible party be created to 
provide consular notification, such as defense counsel or judges.176  
Even though the Vienna Convention may be modified, Howell’s 
suggestion would not solve the issue, but rather complicate matters further.  
The U.S. parties responsible for giving consular notification could change 
depending on each bilateral agreement, and each bilateral agreement could 
alter the parties’ obligations.  Such agreements would create more confusion 
than a uniform application of the Vienna Convention for all foreign 
criminals.  Plus, as Howell acknowledged, modification of a treaty requires 
advice and consent by the Senate.177  The international community wants the 
United States to comply with their Vienna Convention obligations; thus, 
many countries would likely seek such modification.  However, the Senate 
would be unenthusiastic about approving so many bilateral agreements since 
it already ratified the Vienna Convention.  Finally, Howell’s proposal does 
not address the main problem: how to ensure that every state in the United 
States follows the obligations under the Vienna Convention or her suggested 
bilateral agreements.  For these reasons, Howell’s proposal is not a viable 
solution. 
The most basic proposal, as made by Justice Breyer in his dissent in 
Medellin I, is that the treaty obligation to comply with the Avena ICJ 
judgment is self-executing and part of federal law.178  If so, Avena should be 
enforceable in domestic courts without further congressional action.179  
Although Supreme Court decisions are not easily overturned and lower 
courts have an obligation to follow their holdings, states can choose to view 
the United States treaty obligations as self-executing or pass legislation that 
reflects this interpretation.  Interpreting the consular notification 
requirements of the Vienna Convention as self-executing would provide an 
individual cause of action for foreign nationals arrested or detained in the 
United States. 
C.  Individual U.S. States’ Attempts at Compliance 
As of now, four states have enacted legislation to ensure compliance with 
the Vienna Convention within their jurisdiction.  California led the way in 
                                                                                                                   
 175 Howell, supra note 29, at 1375. 
 176 Id. at 1377–78. 
 177 U.S. CONST. art. 2, cl. 2. 
 178 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 179 Id. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018  9:01 AM 
2018] COMPLYING WITH VIENNA CONVENTION POST-MEDELLIN 473 
 
1999 after the first wave of Vienna Convention litigation.  The statute 
provides that, “every peace officer, upon arrest and booking or detention for 
more than two hours of a known or suspected foreign national, shall advise 
the foreign national that he or she has a right to communicate with an official 
from the consulate of his or her country.”180  Nonetheless, it is unclear 
whether a violation of the statute would have any real impact on the outcome 
of a case.  In Oregon, law enforcement officials who detain a foreigner on 
grounds of mental illness are required to “inform the person of the person’s 
right to communicate with an official from the consulate of the person’s 
country.”181  No similar provision exists for criminal arrests, except for a 
general duty of police officers to understand the rights of foreign nationals 
provided by the Vienna Convention.182  Yet, the statute imposes no penalty 
for officers who fail to comply.   
Florida was the third state to enact this type of legislation.  In its current 
form since 2004, Florida’s statute requires the state protocol officer to 
“[e]stablish a system of communication to provide all state and local law 
enforcement agencies with information regarding proper procedures relating 
to the arrest or incarceration of a foreign citizen.”183  In another statute, 
Florida clarifies that “[f]ailure to provide consular notification . . . shall not 
be a defense in any criminal proceeding against any foreign national and 
shall not be cause for the foreign national’s discharge from custody.”184  
Illinois is the most recent state to enact legislation to better implement 
consular notification and access.  The law clarified who was responsible in 
the Illinois criminal justice system for providing consular notice to arrested 
or detained foreigners, when such notice must be given, and what happens if 
notice was not given.185  But like the other state legislations, the Illinois law 
failed to create any new right or remedy. 
The California, Florida, Illinois, and Oregon legislatures have good 
intentions for encouraging compliance with the Vienna Convention, but their 
efforts are likely in vain.  If the President of the United States, the Supreme 
Court, and the international community cannot encourage local law 
enforcement to comply with the Vienna Convention, state statutes that 
provide no repercussion for non-compliance or remedy for foreign nationals 
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whose rights have been violated will have no force.  As previously noted, the 
only way to bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna 
Convention is to actually implement legislation which will force law 
enforcement officials to provide foreign nationals with consular notification 
and access.  Legislation would be best implemented at the national level in 
order to assure uniform compliance across the nation, but state legislation 
could be helpful.  However, the state legislation needs to have some type of 
enforcement mechanism.  Codified encouragements will not be successful; 
such laws are just symbolic and merely persuade instead of enforce, punish, 
or prevent. 
V.  A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
The most efficient way to bring the entire United States into compliance 
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is through federal legislation.  
Federal legislation implementing the Vienna Convention would ensure that 
every state follows the obligations the United States agreed to when it signed 
the treaty in 1963.  With the increase of Americans traveling abroad, it is 
time that the political parties place their differences aside to create adequate 
legislation to afford foreign criminals consular notification and access.  The 
safety of Americans abroad depends on other nations’ reciprocity, which will 
be nonexistent if the U.S. government does not force compliance with the 
Vienna Convention. 
Apart from political arguments, the only potential argument against 
codifying the Vienna Convention is that such legislation may be 
unconstitutional.  The U.S. federal government has particular enumerated 
powers.  The rest of the powers are residual powers left to the states to police 
the health, wealth, and morals of its citizens.186  In Printz, the U.S. Supreme 
Court analyzed the history and federalist structure of the Constitution and 
found two specific limits on the federal government’s necessary and proper 
power in regards to infringing on state sovereignty.187  The Court held that 
one, the federal government could not make a state enact law and 
regulations, and two, the federal government could not require a state officer 
to implement federal law without the state’s consent.188   
Arguably, legislation implementing the Vienna Convention could be 
viewed as commandeering state officials to enforce federal law, but there is a 
key distinction between this legislation and the law at issue in Printz.  In 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, treaties made under the 
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authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land.189  It would 
logically follow that federal legislation executing a treaty would be 
enforceable on the states.  Such legislation would not encroach on the states’ 
police powers since the states agreed to the treaty’s conditions upon its 
ratification.  In other words, the states implicitly consented to having their 
state law enforcement officers implement the scheme of the Vienna 
Convention when it was signed into law under the authority of the United 
States.  Additionally, in Medellin I, the Supreme Court held the Avena 
judgment created an international obligation on part of the United States, but 
none of the relevant treaty sources (Optional Protocol, the UN Charter, or the 
ICJ Statute) “create binding federal law in the absence of Congressional 
implementing legislation.”190  Thus, the Supreme Court left open the option 
for Congress to pass legislation to make the Avena judgment implementing 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention binding federal law.  Therefore, if 
Congress decides to pass a law implementing the Vienna Convention, it 
appears that the Supreme Court would uphold such a law as constitutional. 
Congress thus far has not been able to create a comprehensible piece of 
legislation capable of passing both Houses.  The Avena Act, the first law in 
response to Avena, only created a civil action for foreign defendants who had 
their consular notification and access rights violated.191  Since the law did not 
provide an adequate remedy for foreign criminal defendants, it inevitably 
failed to pass legislation implementing the Vienna Convention.  Plus, the 
law’s function seemed to be unprecedented in the criminal context.  For 
instance, if an officer has violated a defendant’s Miranda rights, the 
prosecutor cannot use, for most purposes, anything the suspect says as 
evidence against the suspect at trial.  The defendant does not have to seek a 
civil remedy for the violation of his Miranda rights.  The Avena Act would 
have applied to past violations as well.192  While this type of application 
would be ideal, its chance of passing into law is slim.  Legislatures would 
receive political backlash for flooding the courts with criminal defendants.  
Thus, despite this moral failure to amend past wrongs, legislation would be 
more likely to pass both the House and the Senate if it applied only to cases 
after the law was ratified.  Considering these flaws, without any discussion 
or debate on the matter, the Avena Act failed to exit the House Committee of 
the Judiciary. 
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The CNCA, introduced by Senator Leahy, was the second law attempting 
to implement Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.193  This law did a good 
job of incorporating the specific language of the treaty into legislation.  The 
statute also provided limited relief to defendants on death row if they could 
prove that the violation of their Article 36 rights resulted in prejudice.194  Of 
all the past proposed legislation, the CNCA was the closest to directly 
implementing the Vienna Convention and the ICJ’s Avena decision.  Avena 
required the United States to provide review and reconsideration for fifty-one 
Mexican nationals on death row and held that it expected the United States to 
provide such a remedy to foreign defendants similarly situated.195  This 
legislation was not a direct application of Avena since it required the 
defendants to show that the violation resulted in actual prejudice before they 
could obtain relief.  The CNCA also placed more limitations on who could 
seek relief since a defendant’s habeas petition had to be filed within one year 
of the statute’s enactment or on the date the government’s impediment to 
filing the petition was removed, whichever was later in time.196  Unlike the 
Avena Act, this statute did not apply retroactively.197 
Despite the positives of the CNCA, this act never reported out into the 
Senate for a vote.  This piece of legislation accommodated both sides of the 
political aisle.  It called for consular notification and access to be given to all 
foreign detainees; yet, for violations it limited the relief to death row 
defendants and further limited the time-frame available for relief.  It 
appeared to be an adequate compromise.198  It is possible that the legislation 
failed to go for a vote due to outside circumstances.  Leal Garcia, a foreign 
defendant who was convicted of kidnapping, raping, and killing a teenage 
girl, sought a stay of execution on account of the violation of his rights under 
the Vienna Convention.199  The stay was denied by the Supreme Court on 
July 7, 2011, in a 5–4 decision across conservative-liberal lines.200  The 
hearing on the CNCA was held twenty days later.201  After such a politically 
and emotionally charged case, it is not surprising that the CNCA failed to go 
for a vote.  Conservative constituents likely viewed such legislation as unjust 
for allowing violent criminals relief based on what they perceived to be mere 
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technicalities.  As a result, the legislation failed and Senator Leahy had to try 
a different route. 
One year later, suitable legislation was placed into the Senate 
appropriations act.202  The provision was basically the CNCA with some 
revisions.  As noted above, the provision set aside the Vienna Convention 
definition since the committee viewed the Vienna Convention as self-
executing.203  The provision additionally described the effect of prior 
adjudication, allowed federal courts one year to respond to petitions, allowed 
cases to be referred to federal magistrates, and required defendants to make 
an initial showing to qualify for review.204  The revisions were likely made in 
response to criticisms of the CNCA, but as noted, there is no documented 
discussion of this provision.  The alterations to the CNCA restricted a 
defendant’s ability to petition for review even further by requiring an initial 
showing, but it also demanded the cases be handled within a specific time.  
The one-year limitation seems short considering the number of cases already 
on the federal docket, but it reiterates that review of these cases should be top 
priority.  Nonetheless, this provision also failed to pass into law.  It was too 
restrictive on the number of foreign defendants who could receive relief, and 
it demanded an implausible time line for review. 
In 2013, the exact legislation was again placed in the Senate’s 
appropriations bill, but the House removed the provision.205  In 2014, the 
same thing occurred; the provision was placed in the Senate’s appropriations 
bill and rejected by the House.206  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
however, were updated in 2014 to aid in the nation’s cause for bringing the 
United States into full compliance with its international obligations.207  The 
changes to the Rules were relieving for those who have been pushing for 
compliance for over a decade, but those amendments were not enough.  They 
only ensured a foreign defendant is notified of his right to contact his 
consulate if he appears before a federal magistrate judge.  Such notification 
is certainly an improvement, but it leaves thousands of foreign defendants in 
the same situation: detained without any knowledge about their rights to 
receive consular assistance from their home country. 
Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were updated in 2014, 
there has not been any proposed federal legislation to bring the United States 
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into compliance.  Whether Senator Leahy has given up or is working on a 
new piece of legislation, the necessity of such legislation grows stronger.  It 
is important for Congress to realize that this bill should not be controversial 
amongst party lines.  This piece of legislation is needed to ensure the entire 
nation’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and most 
importantly, it is essential to ensure safety for American citizens by 
protecting their reciprocal rights abroad.  Out of every piece of legislation 
proposed, the CNCA comes the closet to bringing the United States into 
compliance.  Therefore, this Note recommends that Congress reconsider and 
pass legislation, like the CNCA, now that the American public’s climate of 
opinion is not as heated as it was about Leal Garcia.  Once Americans are 
able to comprehend that this legislation will help protect them abroad, there 
is no reason it should not pass into law. 
The only valid alternative to a congressional act would be that each state 
create their own legislation.  It would be more beneficial to the nation’s 
interests even if only some of the states could make it possible.  Any number 
is better than zero.  However, the state laws presently in place are not strong 
enough to bring the United States into compliance with Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention.  If the only option is to leave the task up to the 
individual states, the states should try to follow the outlined federal scheme 
as closely as possible.  Unfortunately, state legislatures may be the only path 
because of deadlock in Congress.  Nobody can know with certainty the 
likelihood that all fifty states would pass legislation. 
Cases will continue to be appealed, and review and reconsideration as 
demanded by Avena will continue to be denied until something is sealed into 
law.  The United States would not stand for other countries to treat its 
citizens in this manner.  It is time for America to take a stand and give 
foreign defendants the rights our nation agreed to when it signed the Vienna 
Convention almost half a century ago.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To conclude, the United States needs to make all efforts possible to 
comply with its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.  
Consular relations between nations have been around for centuries, and the 
importance has become even more apparent as technology has made 
international travel easier.  Nothing is worse than being detained or arrested 
in another country where one does not speak the language or understand the 
laws.  The United States needs to make an example for other nations to 
follow.  Americans have elected senators and congressman into office to put 
forth legislation in the people’s best interest, and this legislation is necessary.  
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The only way the United States can begin to patch its relations with other 
nations and protect U.S. citizens traveling abroad is through sufficient 
legislation passed by Congress, which will ensure all fifty states comply with 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 
 
